In the past weeks, protests have once again spread across cities throughout Iran. The demonstrations, which began in December 2025, have intensified in recent days despite an increasingly brutal crackdown by the authorities of the Islamic Republic. Preliminary estimates indicate about 600 people killed—a figure likely to rise, with some reporting casualties in the thousands—alongside several thousand arrests.
This is not the first time the Islamic Republic (IRI) has faced widespread social and political discontent, nor the first time it has responded to popular mobilization with large-scale repression. What distinguishes the current wave of protests, however, is the context in which it has emerged: the demonstrations coincide with a moment of heightened vulnerability for the IRI, shaped by the accumulation of internal crises and a deteriorating geopolitical environment.
Widespread discontent
It is now widely acknowledged that a substantial segment of Iranian society has become progressively alienated from the Islamic Republic. This erosion of support is not confined to younger generations or traditionally “secular” constituencies, but extends across a far broader and socially diverse spectrum. As Vali Nasr has noted in a recent interview with Vox, even groups that once formed the regime’s social base have grown deeply disillusioned, driven by persistent corruption, systemic mismanagement, and widening economic inequality.
The reimposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018, following Donald Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, delivered a severe shock to Iran’s economy. The middle class—already eroded by years of soaring inflation and a steady decline in purchasing power— is bearing a disproportionate share of the impact. This external pressure was compounded by the Islamic Republic’s own management of the crisis: rather than cushioning the social costs of “maximum pressure,” state policies largely protected and empowered a narrow circle of oligarchic actors, facilitating the concentration of wealth and influence while further impoverishing middle- and lower-income groups. The outcome has been a marked intensification of socio-economic polarization. These structural stresses came to a head in late December, when the Iranian rial suffered another steep depreciation, severely affecting merchants and further triggering this new wave of protests.
Disastrous material conditions
The country’s severe economic deterioration thus is a central driver of the current wave of protests, though it is far from the only one. Maziyar Ghiabi, an expert on Iran and professor at the University of Exeter, describes the protests as a “multi-level convergence of dissatisfaction”: a mobilization rooted primarily in socio-economic grievances, but also shaped by cultural tensions and long-standing demands for civil rights that have featured prominently in recent protest cycles. Over time, the accumulation of these unresolved crises has progressively alienated ever larger segments of Iranian society. For many Iranians, the Islamic Republic has not only failed to shield the country from the risk of war, but—more fundamentally—has demonstrated a persistent inability to confront the deep economic, environmental, and social challenges weighing on the country.
In the past days, as the protests reached their peak, Iranian authorities imposed a total and unprecedented digital blackout. While internet access has been heavily restricted during previous unrest, this shutdown went significantly further, making even basic telephone communication with people inside the country nearly impossible. The measure immediately fueled fears of large-scale violent repression—fears that were later substantiated by the material that emerged once fragments of information began to circulate.
Among the most disturbing evidence were videos showing families attempting to identify the bodies of their relatives. Although some observers outside Iran questioned the authenticity of certain images, it is notable that State Television itself aired reports from morgues. In these broadcasts, state media acknowledged that while some of the deceased were portrayed as having posed a “security threat” (according to state television, we emphasize), the majority were described as ordinary civilians.
A more violent uprising than in the past
Unlike previous waves of protests, the current mobilization has been marked by a more pronounced use to violence, including by actors who, at least at this stage, appear to be part of the protest movement itself. This does not preclude the possibility that some violent acts may also originate from elements deployed by the authorities with the aim of discrediting and delegitimizing the protests—a tactic observed not only in Iran but in other contexts of mass unrest. At the same time, the heightened presence of violence within these mobilizations calls for a more nuanced interpretation.
As Trita Parsi notes, accumulated social and political anger has reached a level significantly higher than in previous protest waves. In this context, “there is a growing view in certain quarters that violence is necessary, based on past failures to overthrow the regime”, largely as a reaction to the repeated failure of past movements to achieve meaningful political change.
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, on the other hand, shares an interesting perspective from an Iranian feminist activist: “Three years ago, Iranian women created the basis of a non-violent liberation movement that could channel mass politics—today that movement is being excluded. The escalating violence is a result of that exclusion. If the men had continued to follow and the women had continued to lead, we would not be seeing so many awful scenes”.
The use of violence by segments of the protesters must be assessed with caution, not least because of the profound asymmetry between heavily armed state forces and largely unarmed protesters. At the same time, past episodes of violent escalation have tended to weaken protest movements, losing broader public support. As a result, it remains uncertain how the situation will develop in the coming days.
In these dramatic days, when many of us are unable to communicate with loved ones in Iran, another source of deep anguish is the repeated threat of military aggression by the United States. The administration of Donald Trump—which is currently facing protests across the United States following the killing of Renee Good by an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent—has stated that it is prepared to act in the name of “defending the Iranian people.” Hence, the risk of a new military escalation remains dangerously high.
Do not shift responsibility onto the Iranian people
Attributing responsibility for a potential new war to the protests in Iran is deeply misguided. The demonstrations reflect mounting frustration with the Islamic Republic’s repeated internal failures and cannot be treated as the “cause” of international tensions. Should a military intervention occur, it would almost certainly have been planned independently of events on the ground, even if the protests were later instrumentalized as an “alibi” to justify yet another illegal act of military aggression. Shifting this responsibility onto the Iranian people—already caught between internal repression and external threats—ultimately serves to absolve political actors in Europe and the United States of their moral and political responsibility to influence government decisions and uphold international law and the United Nations Charter.
At a moment of profound domestic and international crisis, it is deeply frustrating to once again expend energy dismantling narratives that legitimize military intervention and regime-change projects—particularly in light of the disastrous consequences of the twelve-day war last June. Such scenarios should not even be entertained as legitimate topics of debate if international law were taken seriously. Treating military intervention as a debatable option only poisons the discussion, including within the Iranian diaspora, and ultimately obscures the central issues that demand sustained attention—foremost among them, deepening socio-economic inequality.
In this regard, it is worth reading a compelling article by Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: a common misconception among some critics of the IRI is that Iran’s economic crisis is the result of a supposedly “bloated welfare system” – a sort of “Islamic socialism” – and can therefore be resolved through neoliberal reforms aimed at reducing bureaucracy, strengthening private property rights, relying on market mechanisms, and imposing fiscal discipline. But as Batmanghelidj points out, “these are precisely the reforms that have been attempted by the economic policymakers of the Islamic Republic for nearly three decades, spearheaded by economists who were trained in the United States and United Kingdom to worship the likes of Friedman and Mankiw.”
Far from correcting Iran’s structural economic problems, these policies have in fact deepened socio-economic inequalities and further contributed to the very conditions underlying the current crisis. The same article also highlights how the issue of economic inequality is treated only marginally—and often superficially—by Reza Pahlavi and by the National Union for Democracy in Iran, the pressure group that supports him. Yet the current mobilizations cannot be understood solely as a political or civic protest: they constitute, in both scale and substance, a social uprising.
It is therefore legitimate to ask what, in concrete terms, the prospects and proposals of any supposed “alternative” to the current system might be. As Batmanghelidj observes, beyond “their political rights, Iranians are demanding economic opportunity and social dignity”. In this context, a democratic transition that fails to address economic redistribution would be structurally fragile and ultimately unsustainable. In a system where wealth and power have progressively concentrated in the hands of a small minority at the expense of the vast majority, no credible and genuinely democratic alternative can emerge without directly confronting the deep economic inequalities that shape everyday life in Iran.
Respecting the right to self-determination
As the debate on Iran becomes increasingly polarized, parts of the left and broad segments of the right tend to fall into a false dichotomy: either downplaying or justifying the horrifying crimes committed by the Islamic Republic, or legitimizing a new military intervention in the name of “liberating” Iranians. In both cases, the central issue is sidestepped. In the event of military aggression against Iran, responsibility lies with the governments that plan, carry out, and justify this grave violation of international law—not with Iranian protesters.
Shifting attention toward what Iranians should or should not do, while they are already subjected to severe internal repression and external threats, deflects responsibility from those who actually have political leverage (and responsibilities): Europeans and Americans. The relevant question for them is not how Iranians should behave, but how to exert pressure on their own governments to prevent another act of aggression, which is a crime and a violation of the UN Charter.
It bears repeating that a state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity do not depend on whether it is democratic or authoritarian. Violating them is, in itself, a crime under international law. Genuine solidarity with the Iranian people therefore means rejecting both internal repression and external military aggression. Iran’s modern history—marked by repeated foreign interventions and coups—should have made this lesson unmistakably clear. The Islamic Republic itself, after all, is not an exception to this rule, but one of its consequences: a regime that is also the result of repeated and nefarious foreign interference, most notably the Anglo-American coup of 1953.
PHOTO CREDITS: EPA/MOHAMMED BADRA – A protester holding a sign reading “Neither Shah nor Mullah” participates in a demonstration in support of the ongoing protest movement in Iran, near the Iranian embassy in Paris, France, on January 12, 2026.
YOU’RE READING THE ENGLISH VERSION OF AN ARTICLE WRITTEN FOR THE ITALIAN AUDIENCE. IF YOU FIND IT USEFUL AND YOU WOULD LIKE TO SEE KRITICA BECOMING MORE INTERNATIONAL, PLEASE CONTRIBUTE TO OUR FUNDING HERE.
Analista specializzata in relazioni internazionali e geopolitica, con un focus sul Medio Oriente e sull’Iran. Dopo un Master in Global Security Studies a Sheffield, ha lavorato presso le Nazioni Unite, il Parlamento Europeo e una ONG a Bruxelles. Ha pubblicato analisi e approfondimenti su riviste come il Global Trendometer , Micromega e AREL. Attualmente lavora come freelance in Svizzera.